Westway & Wall Street

 

Beachway

 

 

Westway - the 1974-1985 West Side Highway Replacement Project - was to be the modern replacement for the antiquated, obsolete design elevated West Side Highway along the southern western edge of Manhattan, designed and constructed during the 1920s or early 1930s.  It was to employ a northern extension of the landfill pictured above by the WTC.  The anti Westway people, being anti park and supposedly anti development would sanction the loss of what would have been an incredible waterfront park (and potential fantastic place for political gathers), with the paving over of beachway with Batter Park City.

 

Westway reflected a dislike of elevated urban waterfront highways with its portion south of 29th Street placing the reconstructed West Side Highway within a new tunnel.  Urban waterfront elevated highways had become increasingly disfavored with San Francisco's controversial partially built Embarcadero Freeway, and a growing number of New Yorkers were not that keen on Robert Moses idea of modernizing/widening the existing WSH viaduct.  

 

So the mid-late 1960s planning envisioned for southernmost Manhattan (featuring the WTC & the landfill extension that became Battery Park City), included a new tunnel-box expressway within the new landfill at its inner edge next to the existing bulkhead.  This offered the least expensive way to make an expressway tunnel, for avoiding actual excavation under West Street/12th Avenue, and any utility conflicts, while providing better geometrical connections with the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel. 

 

Nevertheless, despite the cost and geometric benefits, this was to be overruled by a dictate to instead have the southernmost portion of the future new tunnel West Side Highway within West Street, and to have it as an open trench, so extending north past the WTC, before transitioning to a tunnel swinging out into the new landfill at a diagonal beneath new park recreational facilities - nicely designed, but for that this cut across the location of Pier 34 where Titanic had been scheduled to appear, and continuing north with this tunnel beneath the new landfill's new shore line, with a pedestrian promenade, and new residential development upon the one block extensions of the streets into the Hudson.  North of 29th Street, Westway was entirely elevated, as were its connections with the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels.  Westway, which was to be an interstate highway I-487, would have simply connected with the Henry Hudson Parkway at 57-72nd Street, thereby failing to offer a continuous interstate highway to the north connecting with I-95 or I-87.

 

 

Westway's 1974 unveiling was met with an opposition, well crafted to deny the benefits, to deflect any substantive criticisms, e.g. rescind the dictate against using the new landfill for the buried expressway south of Vesey Street, reconfigure it to preserve Pier 34, and even extend the tunnel further north.

 

Central to this anti Westway movement was that it was somehow too expensive, with unsubstantiated claims that it would have enormous cost overruns. that defy any credibility. 

 

"The initial conception was estimated to cost between and $1 and $2 billion, with 90 percent paid for by federal dollars once it was added to the interstate system.  Soon the project's official estimate solidified at slightly over $2 billion.  Even at these quite conservative cost estimates, supporters, detractors, and reporters all agreed with one basic reality about Westway: it would be the most expensive highway ever built in the United States.  Its actual cost would likely have reached in the $4-7 billion range but could have soared far higher.  Looking back and comparing Westway and other large scale mega projects such as Boston's "Big Dig", which involved only two miles of tunnel, and escalated in cost from $4 billion to approximately $15 billion, a prominent Westway advocate  (speaking not for attribution) estimated that Westway would have cost in the tens of billions, perhaps as much as $30 billion when completed.  Others, like Craig Whitaker, think Westway's plan avoided engineering complexities that would have caused such skyrocketing costs." p 16 Fighting Westway- Envirnmental Law, Citizen Activism, and the Regulatory War that Transformed New York City, William W. Buzbee

 

Indeed, as the Boston Big Dig was an incredibly more complicated construction project.  It involved constructing a new 10 lane (5/5) tunnel beneath the existing 6 lane I-93 viaduct (while maintaining traffic), while constructing a tunnel extension of east-west I-90 via jacked box tunnel through  molasses soil condition.  Westway in sharp contrast was constructing a rectangular box tunnel cut and cover tunnel within new landfill, free of the complication of working around existing infrastructure.

 

Coupled with such fear mongering about construction costs were a pair of pretenses, A)  that the US/NY was somehow too poor to afford world class infrastructure, by obsessing that urban expressway projects must be outright cancelled to siphon the construction funds towards "transit" even without any express guarantee of a particular transit project, nor cost analysis of failing to preserve easements from ill placed costlier real estate development; and B) Westway was particularly bad for its use of tunnels, as if placing the stream of vehicular traffic underground is somehow evil. 

 

SO, we saw a law suit upon Clean Air Act allegations because of the pollution "hot spots" within a ten foot or so area of the tunnel portals (embarrassing to petroleum industry), rather the traffic should be without any tunnel (in conformity to that industry's maxim that the solution to pollution is dilution), along with the crafted outcry that N.Y. and the U.S. was somehow too poor to afford Westway.  Of course they must propagandize in favor of cheapness- that we had to cancel Westway outright, and dare not replace it with any other tunnel facility (more petroleum industry opposition).

 

The "clean air" suit failed, whereas a subsequent suit about inadequate data gathering regarding the landfills displacement of the area where they laid their eggs near a sewer outlet.  The authorities respond with a remarkable timidity- the stripped bass issue was a red herring as they could have simply gathered greater data, and used it for a hatchery relocation, e.g. sinking a few rail cars. Yet not only do they surrender, September 1985, they refuse to offer any subsequent plans for a modern under ground West Side Highway replacement.  Or even a fully continuous freeway, let alone anything enclosed in tunnel.

 

The anti Westway movement exploited popular sentiments/concerns to stop the project, but not otherwise. People opposed Westway for a variety of reasons, preserving the piers, scaling down development, or improving park pedestrian access, which the formal Westway opposition was carefully crafted.

 

Yet where was any movement to save pier 34?

 

Yet where was this opposition to development to the south with BPC, and create a grand new beach front park?

And why this sentiment that the US/NY was too poor to have a modern tunnel WSH?

The sort of opposition crafted against Westway is best summed up in this NYT op ed piece by Marcy Benstock:

https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/30/opinion/for-a-westway-trade-in-by-marcy-benstock.html

 

Mayor Koch says he may decide by Nov. 15 whether or not to return to his pre-mayoral-election position in favor of trading in Westway for more than $1.7 billion for mass transit and an alternate road. A decision in favor of a trade-in would be the single most significant step that could be taken to reverse the terrible decline in New York City's transit service.

 

The excuse for depriving mass transit of these desperately needed funds has been that the trade-in is risky while Westway funding is certain. But with the Highway Trust Fund in the red this year for the first time ever, the risk that the Westway superhighway and landfill would take decades to build and might never be finished is greater than any uncertainties with trade-in.

 

Eighteen cities in 15 states would not have opted for trade-in if it didn't work, and they make up a national constituency for improving the trade-in program further. As soon as the Secretary of Transportation approved a Westway trade-in request - no trade-in request has ever been denied - the city would become legally entitled to the full 90 percent Federal share of the Westway cost estimate approved by Congress in 1979 ($1.5 billion plus a quarterly adjustment for inflation). Only the rate at which the funds came in would be affected by annual appropriations. Until fiscal 1979, Congress appropriated more each year than trade-in cities were ready to spend. In fiscal 1980, the $700 million trade-in appropriation plus the $250 million left over from prior years funded 80 percent of the $1.2 billion requested across the country.

 

But severe new problems with highway funding are slowing the rate at which new interstate highways can be financed. Westway's exorbitant $2.3 billion cost (of which Congress has agreed to pay only $1.5 billion) and its complex design, and the history of projects such as the much-delayed Bruckner Expressway, make it unlikely that Westway could be finished in this century.

 

The Highway Trust Fund is in trouble because inflation is adding greatly to highway construction costs at the very time when Fund revenues, based largely on the 4-cent-a-gallon gasoline tax, are declining. Congressional efforts to raise the tax this year failed; pressure is already being exerted to allocate any gas tax increase to such other underfunded programs as Social Security, mass transit, solar energy, and rehabilitation of existing roads.

 

''Interstate completion, in dollar terms, is an unattainable goal,'' according to a June 1980 Federal Highway Administration report. ''Assuming 7 percent annual inflation, current Interstate authorizations through 1990, including the unobligated (Trust Fund) balance as of December 31, 1979, could meet only $30.1 billion of the remaining ($50.75 billion) costs.''

 

New York State's share of that $30.1 billion national total for the next 10 years is unlikely to be more than 5 percent. (Its share of the $3.5 billion interstate apportionment for fiscal 1981 is 4.3 percent.) But 5 percent of $30.1 billion is only $1.5 billion for the entire state for the next 10 years - not enough to finish building Westway, even if the state's entire interstate apportionment were used for that purpose and not a penny went to other interstate projects elsewhere in the the state.

 

If, as seems more realistic, Westway received an average of $100 million a year of the state's average $150 million apportionment, it would take nearly 21 years to cover the 90 percent Federal share of Westway's $2.329 billion cost. Any cost overruns would drag out the construction period still longer.

 

However, in an era of shrinking budgets and growing energy shortages, Congress may have no choice before then but to halt the funding of unneeded highways. In that case, all the city would have to show for years of disruption would be a partly completed landfill in the Hudson River oozing sewage sludge dredged from the bottom, and a transit system in ruins.

 

How much better it would be if Mayor Koch brought the longstanding Westway controversy to a swift resolution with all-out support for a trade-in. An alternate road could then be finished in three years for 5 percent of Westway's cost. The revitalized waterfront that has already begun to emerge despite the inhibiting effect of Westway could be enjoyed by New Yorkers for their lifetimes. Development could go forward on the largely empty 91-acre Battery Park City landfill.

 

Jobs in mass transit and West Side industries would be saved, and new ones created in transit rehabilitation. The one-shot $100 million Westway right-of-way payment the city might have gotten in return for ceding its priceless waterfront to the state would be more than compensated by the recurring revenues and savings that a tradein would generate in mass transit, pier leases, payroll and property taxes, and city services. Most important, the largest, surest untapped source of transportation capital in sight could begin to be used where it is needed most: to prevent the physical and financial collapse of the transit system and make it fit for human beings again. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Marcy Benstock is director of the New York City Clean Air Campaign.

Marcy Benstock makes zero mention of the effective elimination of the NYSE stock transfer tax!

 

Whereas retail sales tax is 7%, the NYSE sales /transfer) tax was a mere 0.1%.  That is until the late 1970s/early 1980s, with 1978 NYS legislation to "rebate" - e.g. refund - the 0.1% tax funds 100% by the early 1980s.  As this was done just prior to the NYSE trading becoming computerized, making feasible the practice of HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING.  I am sure that anyone who is a Harvard educated graduate can see the potential ramifications fiscally.

 

Yet where were you, or any of the other participants of the anti Westway/anti any world class underground replacement for the antiquated West Side Highway viaduct, on this impending change in the tax codes to facilitate HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING, while touting the line that Westway was somehow "too expensive"?

 

The Westway tunnel in fact is the cheapest way to construct a highway tunnel, for being within new landfill (instead of an excavation of 12th Avenue/West Street with the matters of underground utilities).

 

The Westway landfill was also good in the fashion of that which was created with the excavation material from the WTC construction, insofar as providing new land.

 

Yet the Westway landfill was bad insofar as displacing southwestern Manhattan's historic pier district, but where were any protests about that landfill further south.

 

Westway's development would be viewed negatively, never-mind that its new residential establishment would be more of an extension of Manhattan, rather than an urban enclave as BPC- which contrary to the negativity against Westway related development, gets the free pass endorsement of Ms. Benstock in the NY Times.  Why would not Benstock have instead, started a new campaign after Westway's September 1985 defeat, to block construction of Battery Park City (or at least scale it back), to create a new park?  A park that would have been the best site for public gatherings, indeed even potentially a camp out for such a group as Occupy Wall Street!  And how about the matter of Pier 34- Titanic's scheduled berth?  Surely people wanted to see it saved, yet where was Benstock or any of the other figures of the Westway opposition with preserving Titanic's scheduled arrival pier?

 

As did the Village Voice supposed "avant gard" approbation against Westway, as if placing an established expressway corridor traffic stream all upon the surface with traffic light were better than an expressway tunnel, with a surface boulevard more suited to local traffic/pedestrians. 

 

The NYSE got its 100% rebate of its minuscule rate 0.1% stock sales/transfer tax, at the cusp of its computerization, surrendering the economy to High Frequency Trading, while people in general fell for the con that Westway was somehow unaffordable, while saying nothing about the impeding NYSE trading transfer/sales tax exemption, nor its combination with trading computerization.